HISTORY
OF THE SEVENTY SEVENTH DIVISION
Phase 6
The Capture of the Argonne
Part 1
PHASE VI
THE CAPTURE OF THE ARGONNE
THE UNDERTAKING
One name above all others has the 77th Division won from
the map of France and written into American history-The
Argonne. If ever the patriotism of our country should
wane and the national pulse beat slow, let a veteran of
the Argonne arise and tell the story of courage,
self-sacrifice and endurance that carried the Liberty
Division t1voligh this wilderness of France-to Victory.
Hearts will beat quicker at the telling, eyes will
glisten, pride in America and her sons will be stimulated
anew-for, in the annals of the nation, the "Spirit
of the Argonne" must be placed alongside the
"Spirit of' 76."
Black, gloomy,
forbidding, the Argonne Forest, the largest expanse of
woodland from the Mediterranean to the Rhine, stretches a
distance of thirty-nine kilometers from Passevant and
Beaulieu in the south, with the big town of St. Menehold
in its southern confines, to Grand-Pre and the valley of
the River Aire on the north. On the eastern edge of the
forest are Varennes. Montblainville, Cornay and St.
Juvin. On its western boundary are the towns of
Binarville, Lancon and Grand Ham.
No Man's Land Before the Advance on September 26, 1918
For four years,
since the beginning of the Great War, it had been a
region of dark mystery, under the dominion of the Germans
who had early overrun it and adapted its natural features
into a vast, impregnable fortress. It was known to be an
area of densely wooded bills and ravines, of swamps,
brooks and marshland, with tangled underbrush, trailing
vines and briars everywhere.
The First Advance in Which the Division Participated,
September, 1918
The few roads that
afford an approach to it were commanded for miles by the
heights that rise above the deep abris of the forest, and
in all the far-flung battle line of the western front
there seemed no place in German hands more inaccessible
to attack than the Argonne.
The portion held by
the enemy included all but the open woods in the south,
and ran from a line slightly above La Harazee, Le Four de
Paris and La Pte Court Choisse to the northern border on
the Aire, covering an area twenty-two kilometers long and
from seven to nine kilometers wide. Their long
proprietorship had given the enemy perfect knowledge of
this wide terrain. A, glance behind the curtain of trees
would have shown their artillery in position to sweep all
avenues of approach to every ravine and summit. It would
have revealed their machine guns placed not only so as to
command all roads, paths and trails traversing the
forest, but also to furnish a series of interlocking
bands of fire between the trees and along systems of wire
that they had constructed, calculated to make a hostile
advance humanly impossible. It would have disclosed
look-out stations built in scores of favorable tree-tops,
and other high lookout towers constructed to direct the
fire of artillery and machine guns, and, threading in and
out, an intricate and complete railway line supplemented
by a telephone system, furnishing perfect means of supply
and communication between all the units in this
intensively defended sector. No wonder the enemy, who
knew all this, laughed at the idea of the Argonne being
captured by direct attack. It was the one sector of the
Hindenburg line they were sure of. Small wonder too, that
the French, who guessed it, shook their beads and said
" Ce n'est pas possible. "
But the capture of
the Argonne Forest was imperative. It was the hinge of
the great swinging movement that was to drive the Germans
across the Meuse. It was the key that must be turned to
open the way to Grand-Pre, Sedan and the great German
communication centres along the Sedan-Mezzieres railway.
The French said " It can't be done. " The
American said " It can be done. " The 77th
Division said " We'll do it. " And they did.
Officially, the
battle of decision in the great European war is known as
the Argonne-Meuse operation. Popularly it is known as the
Battle of the Argonne. To the 77th Division was assigned
the task of direct attack through the forest. After the
first day, this Division operated alone within the
confines of this forest, and fought its way through its
entire length. When the Division emerged, eighteen days
later, it completed its record by crossing the Aire and
capturing St. Juvin and Grand -Pre, two positions
controlling the northern limits of the Argonne and that
sector of the Aire valley.
THE PREPARATION
For several days and nights before September 26th, there
was considerable commotion on the roads and trails about
La Harazee and La Chalade and through the Bois des Hautes
Batis. It was the stir of preparation. It was the giant
striding and heaving and side-stepping of the guns
getting into position. Big guns, little guns, guns of all
shapes and all sizes-each taking its place for the
terrific overture to commence the opera America was about
to stage in the Forest of Argonne.
All the divisional
artillery from the 152d Artillery Brigade was there-the
304th and 305th Field Artillery with their 75's, the
306th with their 155's and the 302d Trench Mortar
Battery, later armed with their captured German 105
howitzers, and behind them for distant work, were 8-inch
howitzers from Corps and 6-inch rifles from the French
Army. Nearly two hundred guns were gathered together into
this mighty orchestra, merely to cover the relatively
narrow front assigned the 77th Division.
The utmost care was
taken to insure concealment of movement from the enemy.
As much of the work as possible was done by night, and by
day, camouflage and the screen afforded by the trees were
utilized to the fullest extent. In the skies, our
aeroplanes easily had the supremacy, and their patrolling
was so constant and so vigilant that the Boche scouts
never dared venture beyond their own lines.
Every precaution
was taken by the artillery commanders to preserve the
element of secrecy. No registration was permitted. No
observation posts were occupied except by observers in
the uniform of the French, who had been quietly holding
the sector for the past four years. A complete artillery
telephone system was installed, but no English was spoken
over the telephone. The guns were laid by astronomical
observation.
The enemy knew that
there was something impending. During the week previous
to the attack, he exhibited a pronounced nervousness.
Three nights successively, his patrols attacked the
advanced outposts of the French, but were driven off.
Harassing fire was delivered on crossroads Croix Gentin,
and on the 25th of September, a heavy harassing fire with
gas shells was placed on the western part of Bois des
Hautes Batis.
P.C. Pau, Forest d' Argonne - Door in Foreground Shows
Entrance to Quarters of General Alexander at Beginning of
Argonne Offensive, September 25, 1918
He had a
premonition. It may have been gained from irrepressible
noises at night heard by some of his more daring scouts,
it may have been telepathic. But he never dreamed of the,
extent of the attack that was to be made upon him, as
later information proved.
The initial
positions taken by the Artillery were governed to a great
extent by the nature of the terrain and the plan of
advance, which contemplated close cooperation between the
Artillery and the advancing Infantry. It was impossible
to move the guns through the trees covering the entire
territory from which the attack was to be delivered.
Rapid mobility could be insured only by their keeping in
close proximity to the few good roads traversing the
forest. Accordingly, the guns were placed for the opening
barrage along the highways themselves-the 75's of the
304th Regiment on the road running east from La Chalade
across the ridge, where they were joined by a number of
the French 6-inch rifles, the 305th Regiment 75's on the
north and south road in the north-east sector of Bois des
Hautes Batis, and the heavy 155's of the 306th on the
roads in the vicinity of Le Rond Champ and Croix Gentin.
Each battery had to fell between 40 and 50 trees to
obtain the necessary field of fire. This was done by
sawing and wedging the trees, but they were not thrown
over until shortly before the hour set for the opening of
the Artillery preparation. The Headquarters of the 152d
Artillery Brigade were established on the night of
September 25th, at P. C. Pau.
Sixteen avenues in
the enemy wire were assigned to the Artillery to be cut
for the passage of the assaulting troops. Four of these
were at La Fille Morte and four at Taille Rongard on tile
front of the 153d Brigade. Of the other eight, three were
lined out to the east of the Four de Paris across Ravin
Intermediare to Rau des Meurissons and one to the north
of Rau des Meurissons. For the troops facing La Harazee,
two lanes were arranged for to the east of La Harazee and
two to the south of Rau de la Fontaine aux Charmes. By
these means it was designed to provide an open war for
our men to the heights commanding the large ravines in
the enemy's territory and to permit the 153d Brigade to
sweep around to the left and take the high ground between
Abri St. Louis and Abri du Crochet.
The Price of Victory - North of La Four de Paris, Argonne
Forest, October, 1918
At H. hour, after
the lanes had been cut, the plan of attack called for a
rolling barrage of 75's placed 500 meters in front of the
Infantry going over the top, with the 155's firing a
standing protective barrage, 500 meters in front of the
75's mm. barrage, advancing at the end of 25 minutes at
the rate of 100 meters in 5 minutes, by 100 meters
bounds.
On the night of
September 25th, the Infantry of the 77th Division quietly
moved into tile front line. About midnight, the French
outposts were relieved, and the Division was ready for
the attack.
The assault, as
directed by Field Order No. 43, was to be delivered on a
seven and a half kilometer front extending across the
enemy's Position from a point west of La Harazee on the
left, to Courte Chausse and Taille de Ramce on the right.
The Division was disposed in line, all four infantry
regiments being in the front line, with the 305th on the
extreme right, the 306th on its left, the 307th next and
the 308th on the left of the line. This disposition was
not the most desirable, but the frontage to be covered
was so extensive no other disposition appeared possible.
Undoubtedly, at
this time and at all future times in the operation,
because of the extent of front, too great a proportion of
the Division was employed simultaneously and a
disposition in depth, which is desirable from every point
of view, could not be made at the time of attack. The
28th American Division was on the 77th's right and the
1st French Division on its left. A Franco- American force
intended to act as a combat liaison group on the
Division's left flank was also organized, for the purpose
of maintaining contact with the French on the left. This
combat liaison group, consisting of a regiment from the
92d American Division (the 368th), was to have advanced
in conjunction with the left of the 77th Division. It did
not so advance, as subsequent events proved, and, as a
consequence, the left flank of the. Division was exposed
during the whole period of operations of the three weeks
in the Argonne.
Before the battle
opened, the 153d Brigade, in readiness on the right, was
facing the heights of Le Fille Morte and Taille Rong,
with the two ravines, Fond des Meurissons and Ravine des
Meurissons beyond the heights, and on the left, the
expectant forces of the 154th Brigade had before them the
ravines de La Fme an Mortier and de La Fontaine aux
Charmes, with high ground running to the northeast. As to
what lay beyond the enemy wire, they had no information,
other than the words of the Commanding General addressed
to his Infantry officers on the day before the attack,
when he said
" I don't
believe we will find very much opposition in the first or
even second line. Such opposition as we find will be
confined to machine-gun nests. We have all had
opportunity to see the aeroplane photographs of the
ground we are going over. It is very densely wooded and
it is probable that it is very difficult to get through
and that along paths you will find such machine-guns as
are warranted there. You will find machine-gun nests on
the paths and drains. We shall have to work around them
and cut around them through the bush.
" I cannot go
into detail on the work of the artillery and you don't
care about that. I will tell you where it is going to be.
It is hard to draw up a definite plan on account of the
terrain and the difficulty of registering tire. You all
realize that the closer up you get to that barrage, which
is to precede you by 500 meters, the more protection it
is for you. If you lag behind and it passes on, before
you get there, the enemy is up and using his weapons.
Keep as close to it as you can. The limit of 500 meters
was put on it for reasons that I have carefully
considered. It is not necessary for you to stay back
there."
THE ATTACK
The mysterious H hour had been set. At 5:30 on the
morning of September 26th, it was "Over the
top" for the Infantry. At H 3 or 2:30 A. M., the
music started. Hell broke loose. in scores of thundering
Voices. Suddenly the air was split with deafening
explosions and the clamor and shriek of bursting shells,
and soon way back in Florent and le Claon, the houses
were rocking with the concussion. On left and right, the
Artillery of the attacking French and the other Divisions
of the 1st American Army joined in the chorus. Mount
Vesuvius, the San Francisco earthquake and Niagara Falls,
rolled into one and multiplied by ten, blazed, crashed
and roared through the Argonne that night. Never had
ancient quiet been shattered by a din so terrific. It was
America's banner barrage of the whole war.
For three hours the
bombardment of the enemy wire continued with amazing
accuracy and completeness, literally blasting the Germans
from their concrete trenches and leveling lanes in the
wire which for four years had guarded this front.
At 5:30 A. M.
behind the rolling artillery barrage, the 77th Division
went over the top and hurled itself upon the remnants of
the 2nd Landwehr Division of the German Army, the enemy
Division that had been guarding the Hindenburg Line where
it crossed the Forest of Argonne.
Thus began a
campaign unique in the history of the whole European
struggle, in point of character of the battle ground
fought over and of the method of combat employed-"
The Wilderness Campaign " of the Great War. Through
a tangled jungle of trees, clinging vines and thickly
brailed brush, through swamps and muddy morasses flooded
by the constant rains that were falling, over steeps and
across wild valleys, through the mud and the wet and the
cold, the unfaltering soldiers of the 77th Division were
obliged to push on day after day, against invisible
machine-guns, against trenches concealed by foliage and
underbrush, against positions whose forward areas were
perfectly protected by numerous lines of barbed wire and
chicken wire interlaced among the trees, against an enemy
who could not be seen to be fired at and who could only
be nosed out and routed by attacking parties that crawled
along the ground and scouted from tree to tree until they
could engage him in hand-to-hand combat.
Waiting for the Jump Off
At the hour of
attack, side by side, all four regiments of the Division
took the jump-off with elements similarly disposed, one
battalion in the front line, one in support and one in
either divisional or brigade reserve. Practically no
opposition was encountered in going through the enemy
front-line trenches. The big guns had done well. Little
remained of the outer defenses of this particular section
of the Hindenburg Line, but a mighty jumble of shattered
timber, smashed concrete and twisted wire. The torn-tip
condition of the ground, however, covered with a confused
tangle of wire and debris, and the deep ravines that were
encountered at the outset, made progress difficult. To
add to the difficulty, way had to be made through a dense
fog which did not lift during the morning. On our right,
the 154th Brigade soon ran into thickly forested terrain.
without roads, paths or trails.
In spite of these
drawbacks, the lanes cut in the enemy wire, according to
plan by the artillery, were found and steady progress
made by the infantry following behind the rolling
artillery barrage, so that an advance of over two
kilometers was made on the first day. A few shells fell
on our advancing lines and there was some sniping, and,
late in the afternoon, a brisk machine-gun fire on the
307th's right, all of which resulted in a number of
casualties. But nothing was met indicating a strongly
organized resistance. Our line that night was established
on the ridge just north of the Four de Paris-Barricade
Pavillion Carr des Meurissons Road, running thence, from
a point slightly south of St. Hubert's Pavillion, in a
westerly direction and parallel with the Biesme River.
The events of the
next day were very different. The Division resumed the
attack at 5:30 in the morning, preceded by a half-hour's
artillery preparation. It was not long before the Hun
began to snarl and show his teeth.
The 307th Infantry
struck the first resistance, from the heights on its
right front above Rau de La Fan, aux Charmes, whence some
hostile machine-gun fire had been directed the previous
afternoon. It soon became apparent that the enemy was
going to defend these heights as his main line of
resistance and that he held strongly entrenched positions
along their crest and On the high ground of St. Hubert's
Pavillion, Four de Zube and Abri de St. Louis on the
front of the 153d Brigade. The 308th, on our extreme
left, pushed ahead. But the 307th was strongly opposed by
artillery fire accompanied by a heavy enfilading barrage
from machine-gun nests, that the Boche appeared to have
constructed along the whole plateau south of Bagatelle.
Similar strong points confronted the 306th and 305th.
The German plan of
defense was unfolding. It was to be machine-guns to stop
our advance, echeloned in depth and supporting one
another with cross fire, operating from perfect
concealment and from every angle on our front and flanks,
and then artillery and trench mortar shells to scatter
our halted forces. This meant hand to hand. fighting for
our men. Into it they plunged all along the line through
the tangled underbrush and wire, against an enemy they
could not see, but who was reaching them through the
mechanical process of shooting along lines of fire
carefully laid out before hand.
Two companies of
the 306th Infantry, K and B, were the first to stir up
the Huns on the right sector of our line. Starting their
advance with the rest of the Regiment at 5:30 in the
morning of the 27th, these two companies soon found
themselves scrambling down in single file into a deep
ravine containing nearly a hundred dugouts. Signs of
recent enemy occupation and hasty flight were visible,
but everything was quiet and our doughboys pushed ahead,
cheering themselves with the belief that the Boche had
pulled out for at least two or three kilos to the north.
Everything was going smoothly. High spirits prevailed,
for one and all had absorbed a full meal and enjoyed a
good sleep, the night before. Through the village of
dugouts and up the opposite slope went the confident
lines of Infantry. The first platoon to reach the top had
three scouts forward who sent back word that there was
plenty of barbed wire ahead and no openings. The rest of
the companies were halted and an inspection of the wire
started.
Suddenly a red rocket shot up in front and a bugle call
rang out. It was the signal of the waiting Boche. The
next moment everything happened at once. Our entire force
suddenly found itself under intense machine-gun fire,
concentrated on its front and right flank. Trench mortar
shells and grenades whizzed in from all directions. Every
man found it absolutely necessary to hug the ground for
fifteen minutes. Then the machine-gun fire from the front
ceased abruptly. The flanking fire continuing, our men
decided to rush forward. A few minutes later the reason
for the sudden cessation of firing from the front was
discovered. A sergeant and six men from Co. B had found a
gap in the wire, crawled through and captured two enemy
machineguns and two prisoners. These men yelled back to
the main body to cut the wire with all speed and come
through, because the prisoners had reported a large force
of' Boche infantry holding that, position.
Wire clippers
immediately got into action and inside of three minutes,
a wide path was cut through the wire, enabling the entire
two companies to file through and occupy the trenches
which the Boche had vacated only a few minutes before.
This advance and occupation was made under con-stant
flanking fire from machine guns and casualties were
suffered, but they were surprisingly few in view of the
furious enemy fusillade.
Upon reaching the trench
system, both companies jumped in and lined the parapet with expectation of an attack. They did not have
long to wait. Suddenly a volley of potato mashers
(hand-grenades) landed around them, apparently coming
from nowhere, for not a Boche could be seen on account of
the thick brush in front. The order was given to pour a
grazing fire through the brush in an attempt to inflict
casualties by chance shots. After a few minutes of rapid
fire in which the Chauchats joined, everything became
silent. Our men loaded up, in preparation for a possible
second attack, and waited.
The second attack
was preceded by a smoke screen, which gradually enveloped
the entire country to our front in a thick blue haze.
Then over came the Huns, and for the first time it was
possible for our men to see them and take aim before
firing. The Boche almost immediately fell back from the
front, but an alarming cry went up from our left that
they were coming in directly from our left flank. This
rush took Co. K by surprise, and the enemy succeeded in
capturing for a few seconds, the extreme left portion of
our trench. From this point of vantage, he rained
grenades with uncomfortable accuracy into our ranks.
At this stage of
the proceeding, the quick wits and aggressiveness of the
Americans came into play. " Up and at them" was
the cry. One German officer was bayoneted in the act of
throwing a grenade. Three Boche who tried to carry off
one of our men by the collar were shot down in quick
succession by a runner who was using a Chauchat for the
first time in his life. One Boche rifleman had his rifle
within three feet of Co. K commander's chest. The Boche
was shot down before he had a chance to pull the trigger.
The Germans were
beaten back into the cover of the bushes, but they had
succeeded in severely damaging the left flank and
destroying the machine guns posted there for flank
protection. Ten minutes quiet ensued. Then the enemy
adopted new tactics. About thirty or forty of them came
toward our line yelling " Kamerad " with their
hands in the air and, to use the expression of one of the
doughboys, "We fell for it," and ceased firing,
in the belief that a large number of prisoners would be
taken. The unexpected happened. When the enemy arrived
within a few yards of our trench, they attacked with a
shower of potato mashers, which, catching our men
unawares, inflicted a number of casualties. But the Huns
had to pay for it. As they turned to run back, every
rifle in American hands, opened on them. As one of the
veterans of the fight said, "We simply let them have
all we had. "
From that time on,
the entire advantage remained with our men. Whenever the
Boche consolidated for a fresh counterattack, they were
greeted by phosphorous grenades thrown from our lines.
This treatment evidently destroyed their nerve. For,
although they made several more attacks, it was quite
easy to drive them back.
During this
operation, a great deal had been learned by our men of
Hun duplicity, and the kind of fighting that would be
necessary to drive the enemy from the Argonne. The Boche,
too, had learned a lesson. He knew now the kind of
fighting timber these Americans were built of, and that
the closer you got to them the more dangerous they were.
While these two
companies of the 306th were fighting off counter-attacks
at St. Hubert's Pavillion, the other units of our forces
were going through similar experiences at right and left
of them. At many points, the Boche were forced to give
way. Assaulted four times by the 305th Abri St. Louis
finally remained in our bands. Against sweeping
machine-gun fire, the 306th made three attacks on Four de
Zube and wrested it from the enemy. The night of the 27th
saw our lines advanced, except in the center, an average
of a kilo and a half over the day before and the huge
engineer and railroad dump at Barricade Pavillion in our
possession.
When the attack was
renewed on the morning of the 28th, the effect on the
Boche of the previous day's hard fighting became evident.
The strength of his positions along the ridges to our
front bad been shaken. For several hours our advance met
little opposition. St. Hubert's Pavillion and Abri St.
Louis were crossed and mopped up, yielding eleven
prisoners. The 307th passed the Bagatelle Pavillion. Abri
du Crochet was captured by the 305th on our right.
It was apparent
that the enemy had abandoned his first line of
resistance. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, it fell to
the lot of the 307th to gain first contact with his
second line. On the for-ward slope of the draw, north of
Bagatelle, the rattle of machine guns greeted the 307th's
advancing lines. Then down came the artillery. It was
impossible to locate the hostile machine-gun nests, so
carefully were they concealed in the wild growth on the
opposite crest, and anything like an attack on them in
force, was rendered impossible by the terrific shell fire
tearing through the ravine and forward slopes. It became
necessary to dig in and establish temporarily the front
on a general line, 300 meters south of Depot de Machines.
On the right, the 153d Brigade
was having easy sailing. "Easy sailing" in the Argonne, however, had a
meaning different from any the expression ever bore before. It indicated
progress, steady and sure, but only gained by crashing through bushes,
tearing through barbed wire entanglements and smashing down lines of chicken wire.
It meant a progress constantly harassed by Boche snipers
with light automatics, some of them firing from treetops,
who bad to be crept upon and shot, bayoneted, or disposed
of in some way. It signified an advance tortuous,
stifling, struggling, whose single joy consisted in
encountering no organized system of machine-gun positions
of the kind the Boche had constructed on the crests of
the Abris. Such was "easy sailing" in the
Argonne.
At intervals, the "wind" would die out
entirely. The line would come to a halt to get its
bearings, reestablish liaison and scout ahead. Sometimes
there was a lull as the men lay on the ground, and
absolute quiet reigned. A snapping of twigs in the
bushes, the noise of a stealthy approach brushing aside
the branches would fall on the ear. Not a sound from our
line.
Suddenly the air would be torn to shreds by the racket of
a hundred rifles and Chauchats going off at once. A dozen
men would shout "I got him" and someone would
run out and drag in a limp form of a Boche machine
gunner, caught in the
attempt to steal forward under cover and get our men by
surprise. Often there were at least fifty bullet holes in
the body. Everybody's eye bad been on him. The
East-siders and West-siders of New York, the soldiers
from Third Avenue, and from Central Park West, were
becoming adept woodsmen and learning the craft of the
forest hunter.
Under these
conditions, the 154th Brigade on the 29th of September,
"sailed" 3 kilos ahead as far as the heights
bordering the Abri du Crochet, its line running thence
west about a half-kilo along the east and west trail
leading to Bagatelle Pavillion.
Along the slopes
and heights of Abri du Crochet, and Champ Mahaut to the
southeast, our advancing troops uncovered a German
paradise. Here was located one of the famous rest areas
of the German armies, where battle-worn and weary Boches
were taken to fatten up and recover morale amidst amazing
comforts and luxuries.
On the reverse slopes of these hills, huge deep dugouts
had been constructed, each capable of housing fifty men
or more in perfect safety from hostile shelling. On the
heights above these dugouts, more pretentious abodes bad
been constructed for officers and non-commissioned
officers. These were built of concrete, with logs and
concrete roofing, twenty feet in depth, and were
ornamented to resemble Swiss chalets and Black Forest
bunting lodges with peaked roofs and exterior fresco work
of burnt oak. Within were oak wainscoted chambers, fitted
with electric lights and running water, supplied from the
power house in the valley below. Benches and tables, in
rustic solid oak, were supplemented by plush arm chairs
and hair mattresses to cater to the comforts of weary
warriors and, outside
the doors, rose-gardens and favorite flowers from the
Fatherland were cheerfully blooming. "Waldhaus
Martha," "Waldhaus Albertin" and
"Unter den Linden, " as they were variously
named, vied with each other in coziness.
Adjoining
"Waldhaus Martha," was the bowling alley, with
the open-air restaurant and beer garden built above it,
where sat the onlookers on a sunny afternoon, quaffing
their beer and cheering on the bowlers. Down in the
ravine below, where the brook ran, was the great concrete
swimming pool, a close rival to the one in the Columbia
College gymnasium, and here also were found spacious
shower baths supplied with hot water by modern boilers
and concrete furnaces.
The Chapel, the
Library teeming with the best works of German science and
literature and including, even from hated England, the
tales of Rider Haggard and Conan Doyle, the officers'
club with its attractive bar, the big theater, fitted for
moving-picture exhibitions-none of these was wanting to
make the place an ideal spot for quiet life and
recreation. In the photographer's shop our men found
hundreds of plates showing Germans, short and tall, fat
and thin, single and in hilarious groups, having all
kinds of good times with hunting parties, beer parties,
singing parties, Christmas parties, high festivities
generally in their valley paradise, where they had rested
so securely for over four years.
It seemed a pity to
put the rude hands of war upon such a place as this. But
it bad to be done, and the slap was administered so
suddenly that the recreational sojourners had hardly time
to skedaddle before our infantry was upon them. Our men
found every instance of hasty flight. Uniforms were still
hanging in the closets, cigars, wines and other food
luxuries were undisturbed in the storerooms, and meals
were laid on the tables, ready to be eaten.
Needless to say,
Abri du Crochet and Champ Mahaut were soon adapted to our
own uses. Division Headquarters, established at P. C. Pau
on September 25th, was moved up to Champ Mahaut on the 2d
of October, and the fighting battalions in their few
short reliefs from the firing line, when they acted as
Divisional Reserve, were brought to these comfortable
huts for brief breathing spells.
Our center was
heavily opposed during the entire day of the 29th and
little progress was made on the left. But the right
gained a good kilometer and a half through the thick
woods, destroying many machine guns on the way. It
reached the crossroads on the trail leading southwest to
Depot des Machines by 11:30 in the morning.
The balance of that
day and all of the next was spent by the 305th and 306th
in consolidating their positions. Battalions were
distributed in depth, liaison was perfected on the right
and left, and vigorous patrols were sent ahead to feel
out the enemy resistance. Dumps were moved forward,
supplies replenished and lines of communication improved.
The 30th was
anything but a day of rest for the 154th Brigade. The
morning's attack of the 307th failed to dislodge the
enemy in their front. It was finally decided to try a
blasting operation engineered by our artillery. The
coordinates were sent back, the signal was given and a
thirty minutes barrage from our 75's and heavies crashed
down on the opposing ridge. The regimental 3-inch Stokes
mortars were brought up and they added a powerful dose of
thermite to the party the Huns were enjoying. The
preparation was efficient. The infantry attacked in the
afternoon and the enemy was driven from the hills north
of Depot des Machines.
But the Boche did
not retreat far. He retired only a kilometer to the ridge
south of the Binarville-La Viergette Road and occupied
apparently prepared positions extending across this ridge
and through the Bois de la Naza on the front of the 153d
Brigade. Outposts of machine guns and snipers guarded
this line. The 153d Brigade swinging to the left fought
their way step by step against the most persistent kind
of resistance from an invisible and almost inaccessible
enemy. Machine guns were posted to enfilade every path
and to sweep every clearing in the forest. One by one
they had to be rooted out. Ladders were constructed for
climbing over long stretches of chicken wire, while the
bullets were singing along them, close to the ground
where, according to the Boche plan, our men should have
been.
Our artillery could
render little aid. The hills and deep ravines covering
the entire terrain complicated the calculation of all
data. Observation and checking were impossible.
Furthermore, our lines were often so close to the Boche
it would have been impossible to reach the latter without
shooting into our own men. Narrow woods trails, deep in
mud, militated against the mobility of the guns. It was
always a desperate struggle of men and horses to get them
into position.